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I. INTRODUCTION
For almost two years, from early 1973 to September, 1974, Watergate
dominated the nation's consciousness. On a daily basis it was on the front
pages-usually the headline; in the news magazines-usually the cover
story; on the television news-usually the lead. Washington, D.C., a town
that ordinarily is obsessed by the future and dominated by predictions about
what the President and Congress will do next, was obsessed by the past and
dominated by questions about what Richard Nixon had done and why he
had done it. Small wonder: Watergate was the political story of the
century.
Since 1974, Watergate has been studied and commented on by
reporters, television documentary makers, historians, and others. These
commentators have had an unprecedented amount of material with which to
work, starting with the tapes, the documentary record of the Nixon
Administration, other material in the Nixon Presidential Materials Project,
plus the transcripts of the various congressional hearings, the courtroom
testimony of the principal actors, and the memoirs of the participants. But
despite the billions of words that have been written and said about
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Watergate, fundamental questions about the scandal remain. These
questions include: Why did the burglars break into the offices of the
Democratic National Committee ("DNC")? Who was Deep Throat? Why
didn't Nixon burn the tapes once Alexander Butterfield had revealed their
existence? Did Nixon cut a deal with Vice President Gerald Ford-a
resignation for a pardon? These are the questions I will take up in this
essay.
II. WHY DID THEY BREAK IN?
The day after the arrest of the burglars in the offices of the DNC,
Nixon scribbled some comments on a Ron Ziegler memo that characterized
the break-in as a "third-rate burglary." Nixon wrote, "He [Ziegler]
understated. Attempt at burglary. Bizarre business. There was no
involvement whatsoever by W[hite] H[ouse] personnel."
Thus did the cover-up begin, and to this day those words constitute
Nixon's basic defense; he knew nothing about it and he could not for the
life of him figure out why anyone would want to break into the DNC.
In a lifetime of bold and brazen acts, this was the boldest and most
brazen, as well as the most successful. Two decades later, Nixon's query
still dominates discussion and investigation of Watergate. Why break into
the DNC? Who on earth ordered such a foolish thing?
The answer revolves around the strange relationship between Howard
Hughes, Larry O'Brien and Richard Nixon. Hughes gave money to both the
Democratic and Republican parties and, Nixon believed, had paid off a nine
million dollar debt from Hubert Humphrey's 1968 campaign. Nixon knew
that Hughes had O'Brien on his payroll. Nixon also knew that Hughes had,
at various times over the preceding twenty-five years, given money to him
[Nixon]--often large amounts, in cash. Further, Nixon had made some big
money from Florida real estate investments made with Bebe Rebozo-and
evidently Hughes was in on the operation, and Nixon was afraid that
O'Brien knew about the whole scheme.
In 1972, H.R. "Bob" Haldeman talked with White House aide Jeb
Magruder about the puzzle of who ordered the break-in and why.
Haldeman's handwritten notes of the conversation read: "Plan hatched
here-Hunt, Liddy & Colson. Colson called Jeb twice-to get going on this
thing. Specifically L. O'Brien info re Fla. dealings."
Another Nixon defense is his question: Why should I have taken
chances when I knew I was a sure-thing winner in the 1972 election? The
effectiveness of the argument relies on the public's short and faulty memory.
1776 Vol. 18
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 7
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss3/7
Ambrose
In early 1972 Nixon was trailing Senator Edmond Muskie in the polls. His
big lead did not come until after the Democrats nominated George
McGovem-by which time he had already put the pressure on CREEP
Chairman John Mitchell to get more intelligence on what O'Brien knew.
Also remember, in 1968, Nixon had a twenty-eight point lead over
Humphrey, but almost got beat. He was ahead of John Kennedy in 1960,
too, only to lose. To sum up, in the spring of 1972, Nixon was by no
means a certain winner and he wanted every edge he could get.
"To this (lay," Haldeman said at a 1987 conference at Hofstra Universi-
ty, "no one knows who ordered the break-in." That is true in the strictest
sense-no one has ever found an order reading, "break into the DNC, signed
RN." Nixon and his associates and defenders have raised all sorts of dark
possibilities: that it was a CIA or JCS plot, or a John Dean/Al Haig plot,
or that the Democrats set it up themselves.
In my opinion, John Mitchell ordered the operation; his principal agent
was Jeb Magruder; the operatives were men hired by Chuck Colson, G.
Gordon Liddy and H. Howard Hunt; all these men were responding to
unrelenting pressure from Nixon to find out what O'Brien knew.
III. WHO WAS DEEP THROAT?
Next question: Who was Deep Throat? Once again, I don't have an
answer, only an opinion. Deep Throat was a composite character made up
by Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward for dramatic purposes (and it surely
worked). Their information came from a variety of sources, none of whom
met them in underground garages in the middle of the night. This is based
on my judgment that no one person in the Administration knew as much as
Deep Throat supposedly knew.
A more substantial question is: What was the role of the press in
general, and Woodward and Bernstein in particular, in forcing Nixon's
resignation? The media, naturally enough, thought that it was central,
critical, and the sine qua non of the entire Watergate story. In my view, the
press played a peripheral role. Had there been no press coverage, or no
Washington Post investigative reporting, there still would have been a trial
in Judge John Sirica's court, there still would have been the Ervin
Committee Hearings, and there still would have been impeachment
proceedings. What brought Nixon to resignation was not the press but his
own conduct, as revealed by the constitutional process that was based on the
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IV. WHY DIDN'T NIXON BURN THE TAPES?
What many people believe to be the most puzzling question of all is
actually the easiest to answer. The question is: When Butterfield revealed
the existence of the tapes, why didn't Nixon pile them up on the White
House lawn, call in the reporters, pour some gasoline over the tapes, say,
"watch, you bastards!" and toss a match on the pile?
John Connally urged him to do just that. Connally sent a message to
Haldeman: "Please, Bob, use your influence to convince the President to
bum the tapes .... Say they must be destroyed now that their existence
has been made public."
There was a perfect cover. Nixon could say that the conversations
dealt with national security affairs and matters highly embarrassing to
politicians from both parties. Since that was true, and since every politician
who had been in the Oval Office since 1971 was at that moment racking his
brain to remember what he had said there, a bonfire would have elicited
protest and criticism, but it would not have destroyed the President. Nor
would it have been illegal. Nixon regarded the tapes as his personal
property, a position upheld by the precedent that any President's papers are
his personal property, and a position upheld by the courts in 1992. As the
tapes had not been subpoenaed, burning them would not be destroying
evidence in a criminal case.
Still, a bonfire would have raised another storm. Leonard Garment
warned that it would forever seal an impression of guilt in the public mind.
Spiro Agnew agreed with Garment.
Haldeman also opposed destroying the tapes, but his reason had nothing
to do with public opinion. Rather, it got straight to the heart of the matter.
As Nixon later put it, "Haldeman said that the tapes were still our best
defense, and he recommended that they not be destroyed."
Later, Nixon's standard response to the question, what is the lesson of
Watergate? became, "bum the tapes." But at the time, in 1973, that was the
last thing he would do.
To understand why, it is first necessary to point out that only two men
in the Oval Office knew that a tape recorder was running. They were
Richard Nixon and H.R. Haldeman. That makes everything they said
suspicious-were they speaking spontaneously and truthfully, or were they
speaking for the record? It is impossible to tell. Listening to the tapes
today, when you hear Nixontell John Dean, "but that would be wrong," you
just can't tell if he means wrong in a political sense, or a moral sense, or a
constitutional sense, or a legal sense-or if he just wants to get that sentence
on the tape, just in case.
1778 Vol. 18
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Now flash forward to Nixon's situation had it come to an impeachment
and a trial before the Senate. Nixon's lawyer walks into the Senate chamber
with a tape recorder, and delivers the following speech: "Senators, you
have heard Mr. Dean accuse the President of paying blackmail money, hush
money, to Howard Hunt. Now, Senators, I want you to hear the President
himself, to hear his response when Dean told him the money had to be
paid." And with that, the lawyer hits the start button on the tape recorder,
and the Senate hears Nixon say, "but that would be wrong." The lawyer
hits the stop button. "Senators, you heard it yourselves. I rest my case."
There are two basic factors at work here. First, the tapes were Nixon's
best defense, just as Haldeman said, for the obvious reason that they
contained so many exculpatory statements by Nixon; statements that he had
made in his own transparent way whenever he remembered that the recorder
was running. Nixon had already drawn on that asset in the preparation of
a summary he had given Fred Buzhardt, which Buzhardt in turn had given
to the Republican staff members of the Ervin Committee. This summary
was what led to the Butterfield admission that a taping system existed in the
White House (Butterfield was responding to a question about how the
President could have such a good memory as to quote directly from
conversations more than a year old; in other words, as so often, Nixon had
no one to blame but himself for his problems).
The second factor was explained by Haldeman, who pointed out that
Nixon "just never dreamed it was possible that the tapes would ever be
heard by anyone other than himself." They were his property. They were
protected by executive privilege. Everything Nixon had said in his July 7,
1973 letter to Ervin ("I shall not permit access to Presidential papers")
applied equally to the tapes.
Nixon did not destroy the tapes because they constituted his best
defense, if used selectively, and because he was certain he could command
complete control of them. What Nixon failed to anticipate was the
persistence with which Ervin, the Special Prosecutor, and Judge Sirica
would demand access to the tapes, or the power of public opinion that
would muster behind that demand, or the independence of the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court was critical. Right up to the end of July, 1974,
Nixon was fairly confident the Court would rule that the tapes were his to
do with as he saw fit, or at least that the Court would divide, with two,
three, or possibly four votes upholding executive privilege, which would
allow him to defy an order to yield up the tapes. It was the unanimous
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On July 21, 1973, Nixon wrote a private note on the subject: "If I had
discussed illegal action, I would not have taped. If I had discussed illegal
action and had taped, I would have destroyed the tapes once the investiga-
tion began."
Whether this was self-deception or pure cynicism, or something in
between, is impossible to say. He certainly had discussed illegal action on
March 21, 1973, with John Dean; indeed he had ordered illegal action (the
payment to Hunt) and it had been carried out. The attempt to use the CIA
to turn off the FBI back in June 1972, the break-in to Daniel Ellsberg's
psychiatrist's office, and other Nixon Administration actions had some cover
of national security, but the Hunt payment was in direct response to
blackmail.
With regard to Nixon's second sentence, he explained in his memoirs
that he decided the tapes were "my best insurance." If other aides turned
against him, as Dean had done, "the tapes would give me at least some
protection." They would provide a defense to sum up, so long as Nixon
could make selective use of the tapes. His greatest fear, repeated innumera-
ble times to Haldeman, was that Dean had his own tape, made on a machine
hidden in his lapel.
V. VICE PRESIDENT FORD AND THE PARDON
Before beginning my discussion of the pardon, I want to take this
opportunity to quote Richard Nixon on the subject of pardon and forgive-
ness.
At a news conference on January 31, 1973, Courtney Sheldon of the
Christian Science Monitor asked Nixon if, now that the war was over, he
had given any thought to amnesty for draft evaders.
Nixon replied that "it takes two to heal wounds," and, in view of the
criticism he was getting over the settlement, "it makes one [wonder] whether
some want the wounds healed." He said he had achieved "peace with
honor," even though "I know it gags some of you to write that phrase." As
to "healing the wounds . . . certainly I have sympathy for any individual
who has made a mistake. We have all made mistakes. But also, it is a rule
of life, we all have to pay for our mistakes."
He went on:
Amnesty means forgiveness. We cannot provide forgiveness. . ..
Those who served paid their price. Those who deserted must pay their
price, and the price is not a junket in the Peace Corps, or something like
1780 Vol. 18
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that, as some have suggested. The price is a criminal penalty for
disobeying the laws of the United States.
Now, why did Nixon choose Ford for his Vice President, and why did
Ford pardon Nixon? Spiro Agnew's resignation in October 1973, triggered
the Twenty-fifth Amendment, which required Nixon to select a new Vice
President, subject to confirmation by a majority of both Houses of Congress.
Who can say what went through Nixon's mind? As Ford aide Robert
Hartmann has commented, "no man living can outguess Richard Nixon
when it comes to figuring things out to the third, fourth, and fifth degree of
indirection." Certainly, there were a lot of nuances and complexities-much
to think about.
The terms of the Twenty-fifth Amendment gave Nixon an invaluable
asset; in the event of his resignation, impeachment, or death, it was nothing
less than the ultimate prize in American politics. He was sure to spend it
in such a way as to do himself the most good. But because the wording of
the Twenty-fifth Amendment was mandatory, he had to spend it quickly.
Nor could he spend it freely, as his selection was subject to congressional
confirmation.
Under ordinary circumstances, Nixon would have given his full
attention to his momentous decision, but October 10, 1973, was not an
ordinary occasion. Nixon's biggest problem was not selecting a replacement
for Agnew, but finding someway to avoid the demands of Special Prosecu-
tor Archibold Cox for Watergate related tapes. The case was before the
United States Court of Appeals, which was scheduled to hand down its
ruling in a day or two.
When Nixon saw Attorney General Richardson on the afternoon of
October 10, his first words were, "now that we have disposed of that matter
[Agnew's resignation], we can go ahead and get rid of Cox."
But if the ruling of the court of appeals went against him on the tapes,
even getting rid of Cox would not solve his problems. If he refused to
comply, he would set off a major constitutional crisis. Uppermost in his
mind, then, was not the Twenty-fifth Amendment, but Section 2 of Article
I of the Constitution, which states that the House of Representatives "shall
have the sole Power of Impeachment." In short, if the firing of Cox and the
defiance of a court order set off a serious impeachment proceeding, Nixon's
fate would rest, first of all, with the Republican members of the House.
Nixon could not count on their unquestioning support. Aside from his
Watergate problems, there was the Christmas bombing. Coming immediate-
ly after Henry Kissinger's election-eve claim that "peace is at hand," the
bombing had led to widespread criticism of the President, from Republicans
1994] 1781
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as well as Democrats. There was a further cause for worry, one that was
expressed by Nixon's Congressional liaison aide, William Timmons, in a
post-election memorandum: "Unfortunately, many GOP members feel the
President was interested in his own reelection and didn't do enough to help
them in their campaigns. This could result in an independent attitude
toward the President." Worst of all, in part because of Nixon's single-
minded concentration on his own reelection, the Democrats controlled the
House.
To sum up the situation on the afternoon of October 10, what Nixon
most needed to buy with the asset the Twenty-fifth Amendment gave him
was some Republican support in the House of Representatives.
Immediately after receiving Agnew's resignation, Nixon began
conferring with congressional leaders, cabinet members, and his aides.
Washington was agog; the atmosphere was likened to a political convention.
In the midst of intense speculation, the names most often mentioned were
Governors Nelson Rockefeller and Ronald Reagan, along with John
Connally, Elliot Richardson, and Barry Goldwater. Gerald Ford's name,
however, was not mentioned.
Nixon's most important conference on October 10 was with presidential
advisors Bryce Harlow and Mel Laird. Between them, they knew the House
as well as any two men in the country. Laird had been a congressman for
sixteen years; Harlow had been President Dwight Eisenhower's liaison with
Congress for eight years and Nixon's for two years. They told the President
he had but one choice, Gerald Ford.
The Speaker of the House, Carl Albert, told the President bluntly that
Ford was the only Republican who could be quickly confirmed. Late that
evening, Laird made a telephone call to Ford. "Jerry," he said, "if you were
asked, would you accept the Vice Presidential nomination?" Laird did not
say that he was inquiring for Nixon, but as Ford noted, "someone had told
him to call."
In short, Nixon had made up his mind before he saw the results of his
poll. The poll itself (recently released by the National Archives) showed
how popular Ford was in the House, as well as how little support he had
outside that body. In the House, there were eighty votes for Ford, thirty-
five for Rockefeller, twenty-three for Reagan, and sixteen for Connally.
Nixon could hardly have been surprised by the results of his poll. He
was one of the best at counting votes in the Congress, almost as good as
Laird and Harlow. That was why he had picked Ford even before he
opened a single ballot.
Figuring out Nixon's motives for his decisions is a popular, if not
frustrating, political parlor game. With regard to his selection of Ford, H.
1782 Vol. 18
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R. Haldeman told me once that Nixon picked Ford because he reasoned that
as the members of the House knew Ford so intimately, they would never
impeach Nixon if it meant Ford would become President. Haldeman's
interpretation is that Ford was Nixon's insurance policy. Others have
adopted the same view.
If true, Nixon had made a fatal blunder. As the poll showed, Ford was
widely popular among the Republicans in the House; as the event showed
in August of 1974, republican congressmen could hardly wait to substitute
Ford for Nixon as President. If Nixon wanted an insurance policy, he
should have supported Agnew's demand for an impeachment inquiry, as a
way of keeping Agnew in office. How many Democrats would have been
willing to vote to impeach Nixon if Agnew had been Vice President?
It is always dangerous to ascribe to Nixon a single, simple motive, but
in this case it seems too clear that he selected Ford as a way of appeasing
Republican members of the House of Representatives; with Cox, the tapes,
and the defiance of a court order uppermost in his mind. Others would
argue that what Nixon had in mind was further down the road; his own
resignation, and consequent need for a pardon. In this interpretation, he felt
he could count on "good old Jerry" more than anyone else.
On August 1, 1974, Haig met with Ford. Haig's purpose, he later
testified, was to tell Ford that Nixon was close to resigning and "to
emphasize to him [Ford] that he had to be prepared to assume the presiden-
cy within a very short time." But there was more to it than that. As Ford
later testified, "it was his [Haig's] understanding from a White House
lawyer that a President did have the authority to grant a pardon even before
any criminal action had been taken against an individual." It was a private
meeting. It inevitably raises suspicion that a deal was cut between Haig and
Ford; a pardon for a resignation.
The only two men who know for certain, both vehemently deny that
a deal was made. Judging by the extensive written commentary, much of
which was by men close to Nixon or Ford, their denials are hard to believe.
But unless a tape recording emerges, or unless either Haig or Ford say
something different from what they have already testified, no one will ever
be able to prove that a deal was cut.
I cannot resist the temptation to do some speculation of my own. I
begin with some observations. First, while Nixon and Ford were close
professional associates, they were not intimate friends who trusted each
other. At their October 10, 1973 meeting, Ford noticed that Nixon was
relaxed, that he was wearing a sports jacket and slacks, and that he was
smoking a pipe. Ford had never before seen Nixon relaxed, casually
19941 1783
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dressed, or smoking. The fact that all this was new to Ford tells a great
deal about how close their quarter-century old relationship was.
Second, Nixon owed Ford far more than Ford owed Nixon. It was
characteristic of Nixon that he got more loyalty than he ever gave, and that
was certainly true in this case. Ford had staunchly supported Nixon
throughout his career, from the fund crisis of 1952 to the Watergate crisis
of 1972-74, while Nixon had double-crossed Ford in the Douglas affair, and
throughout his first term treated Ford with disdain that bordered on
contempt. Nixon had lied to Ford from January of 1973 to August of 1974
when he insisted that he had no involvement in the Watergate cover-up.
Nixon not only allowed, but encouraged Ford to make himself vulnerable
by forthrightly and indignantly defending the President.
While it is true that Nixon had chosen Ford to become Vice President,
both men knew that circumstances rather than admiration, friendship, or
trust dictated that choice. Further, there is no evidence that Nixon attempted
to get Ford to agree that in return for the Vice Presidency, Ford would grant
a pardon if worse came to worst. Nixon did ask Ford to promise that he
would not be a candidate for the Presidency in 1976; a promise Ford gave-
which in itself is a reminder of how valuable private, personal promises are
among American politicians.
Third, it was the Vice President, not the President, who occupied a
position of strength at the beginning of August, 1974. Ford enjoyed deep
and wide-spread support from the public and from the Congress; Nixon did
not. Nixon could not say, "look, either you promise to pardon, or I'll never
resign." The Presidency was no longer Nixon's to give or keep.
Fourth, it is necessary to recall what Bryce Harlow said to Ford in a
discussion following the August 1st meeting between Haig and Ford.
Hartmann had arranged the get-together because he wanted to convince Ford
to tell Nixon that there could be no deal, or even the appearance of one.
Better the message came from Harlow than from Hartmann. Harlow told
Ford,
it is inconceivable that [Haig] was not carrying out a mission for the
President, with precise instructions, and that it is the President who
wants to hear your recommendations and test your reaction to the
pardon question. But the President knows that he must be able to swear
under oath that he never discussed this with you and that you must be
able to swear that you never discussed it with him.
Ford saw the point. He called Haig to say that he had no intention of
recommending whether or not Nixon should resign. Ford added that
1784 Vol. 18
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nothing he and Haig talked about (meaning the President's pardoning
power) should be given any consideration whatsoever as indicating any
intent on his part to involve himself in Nixon's resignation decision. Haig
said he understood and agreed.
That sounds far more believable than the opposite conclusion, that Haig
and Ford entered into a solid deal of pardon for resignation. My own
reading of Nixon is that he had thought the whole thing through and
concluded that the far greater risk was to have Haig ask straight out for a
pardon agreement. That might have caused Ford to bristle, grow indignant,
get angry, throw Haig out of his office, and set his feet in cement against
a pardon. It is often true in American politics that what is not said, but that
both sides can count on as being understood, leads to a more solid
agreement than what is promised.
Fifth, Nixon could anticipate political developments accurately.
Looking ahead,, he knew President Ford's problems in the late summer of
1974 would be many and difficult, and that the last thing the new President
would want would be a flood of pre-Nixon trial publicity. For his own
good, for the good of the Republican party, for the good of the country,
Ford would want to avoid the orgy of Nixon-bashing that would accompany
a Nixon indictment and trial.
Nixon could be confident that Ford would both be told and would
figure out for himself that picking a jury for a Nixon trial would dominate
the headlines for weeks, perhaps months, and still might prove impossible.
An actual trial would be even worse. As to what might be revealed in a
trial, again Nixon could count on Ford's shuddering at the thought of that.
Nixon knew that Ford was going to have to pardon him, and he did not
send Haig to see Ford to extract such a promise. Being Nixon, he could not
help himself from meddling, manipulating, and seeking reassurance. So
Nixon sent Haig to see Ford, not to make a deal, but to make sure Ford
knew that as President he had the right to pardon even before an indictment.
When Haig reported that Ford had been so informed, Nixon was satisfied.
A week later, he resigned.
One month later, Ford pardoned Nixon for all crimes he may have
committed. I confess that at the time I shared the feelings of helpless rage
that overcame millions of Americans. My fury knew no bounds. I cursed,
I screamed, I swore I'd never forgive Jerry Ford. I was certain Ford had
entered into a corrupt bargain with Nixon.
Over the years, however, I have come to realize that Ford was
absolutely right to do what he did. It may have been something he had to
do, but he still deserves credit for doing it forthrightly, courageously,
1994] 1785
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quickly, and at his own expense. The last thing this country needed in
1975-76 was to tear itself yet further apart over the fate of Richard Nixon.
My subject has been Nixon's selection of Ford for the Vice Presidency,
and Ford's pardon of Nixon. My conclusion is that in October of 1973,
Nixon had no choice, and that in September of 1974, Ford had no choice.
The circumstances that dictated the developments were the structure of the
existing situations, not the personalities of the two men, nor any secret
deals.
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